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  With the intensification of market competition, the competition form of firms is evolving from 
the competition among firms to the competition among supply chains. This paper considers a 
market with two competing supply chains consisting of one supplier and one manufacturer. The 
two supply chains compete on products’ quantities and research and development (R&D) level 
when the two manufacturers conduct technological innovation. This paper analyses the supply 
chain competition in three scenarios: two decentralized supply chains (DD), one decentralized 
supply chain and one centralized supply chain (DC) and two centralized supply chains (CC). The 
results indicate that the production quantity, the R&D level and the total profit of the integrated 
supply chain in DC scenario are the largest, CC scenario comes second, those of the DD scenario 
come third and those of the decentralized supply chain in DC scenario are the smallest. CC 
strategy is the supply chain system’s Nash equilibrium, which is good for the both supply chains, 
and there is no prisoner's dilemma. 
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1. Introduction  
 
With  the  intensified  competition  among  supply  chains,  the  enterprises  have  to  maintain  continual 
technological innovation to improve quality of products, to reduce the costs of produce, as well as to 
develop new products, in an  effort to increase competitive edge. For example, automobile makers 
conduct cost-reducing R&D to lower prices of their products and to sell more cars. Most manufacturers 
who buy their products through suppliers have to decide whether to establish an integrated supply 
channel or a decentralized one. In this paper, we study this question in the presence of competing 
supply chains under Cournot competition. 
Prior literature examined R&D cooperation in different modes. An important stream of literature in 
duopoly competition, starting with D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), focused on horizontal R&D 
cooperation  under  Cournot competition  and did  not  consider the effect  of competition on  channel 
coordination  incentives,  and  cooperation was  shown  to be  the  optimal decision  (Suzumura, 1992; 
Motta,  1992;  Suetens,  2005).  Suzumura  (1992)  examined  the  positive  and  normative  effects  of 
cooperative  R&D.  Motta  (1992)  analyzed  a  partial  equilibrium  model  with  vertical  product   
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differentiation, Cournot competition and quality determined by R&D expenses. Qiu (1997) compared 
Bertrand with Cournot equilibrium in a differentiated duopoly with R&D competition and found that 
Cournot competition could induce more R&D effort than Bertrand competition. Banker et al. (1998) 
examined  whether  equilibrium  R&D  levels  increase  as  competition  intensified  in  three  different 
competitive  environment;  namely  asymmetric  duopolistic  competition,  a  symmetric  duopoly  and 
symmetric oligopolistic competition. Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) extended the literature on cooperative 
R&D in an oligopoly with spillovers by introducing uncertainty and focused on spillover of innovation. 
De Fraja and Silipo (2002) compared the subgame perfect equilibrium emerging in four regimes of 
R&D competition among duopolists; namely full competition, coordination of research strategies, joint 
venture with cross licensing of patents, and full collusion in R&D and the product market. Amir et al. 
(2003)  focused  on  the  performance  of  noncooperative  and  cooperative  R&D  in  product  market 
competition and compared the equilibrium levels of R&D, producer with consumer surplus, and social 
welfare.  Suetens  (2005)  analyzed  the  relationship  between  technological  spillovers  and  R&D 
cooperation in a duopoly experiment based on the model of D'Aspremont and Jacquemin. Cellini and 
Lambertini (2009) investigated dynamic R&D for process innovation in a Cournot duopoly where firms 
may  either  undertake  independent  ventures  or  form  a  cartel  for  cost-reducing  R&D  investments. 
Besanko  and  Wu  (2013)  explored  the  trade-off  between  R&D  cooperation  and  competition  with 
learning. The above literature on R&D cooperation focused mainly on horizontal R&D cooperation 
among firms who are competitors in the same product market. However, more and more firms with 
supply chain relationships are cooperating in R&D activities. 
On the other hand, a parallel stream of literature, represented by McGuire and Staelin (1983), focused 
on the channel design problem in competing supply chains under Bertrand competition. This stream of 
literature  started  with  McGuire  and  Staelin  (1983),  who  investigated  the  effect  of  product 
substitutability  on  Nash  equilibrium  distribution  structures  in  a  duopoly  where  each  manufacturer 
distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer, which may be either a franchised outlet or a 
factory store. Gupta and Loulou (1998) analyzed a four-stage game with two manufacturers and two 
retailers,  where  the  inter-channel  contracts  are  linear  and  observable  and  manufacturers  invest  in 
process improvements to reduce their production costs. They found that the optimal channel structure 
decision  depends  on  interactions  between  two  parameters:  the  degree  of  substitutability  between 
products  cost  reduction.  They  also  reported  that  process  innovation  accents  the  profit  difference 
between integrated and decentralized channels and makes the Prisoner’s Dilemma situation worse in 
the choice of distribution channel structure. Banerjee and Lin (2001) examined the incentives of firms 
in  vertical  RJVs  and  analyzed  two  cost-sharing  contracts,  the  proportional  and  the  fixed  fraction 
schemes. Ishii (2004) analyzed the effects of cooperative R&D in two vertically related duopolies, 
which are two final-good manufacturers and two input suppliers, with horizontal and vertical spillovers. 
They  compared  the  equilibrium  outcomes  under  four  vertical  R&D  organization  modes:  non-
cooperative  R&D,  vertical  R&D  cartels,  vertical  non-cooperative  RJVs  and  vertical  RJV  cartels. 
Boyaci and Gallego (2004) modeled customer service competition of two competing supply chains, 
each consisting of one wholesaler and one retailer. They discussed the derivation of the equilibrium 
service strategies, resulting inventory policies, and profits for each scenario. They found coordination 
was a dominant strategy for both supply chains, but as in the prisoner’s dilemma, both supply chains 
were often worse off under the coordinated scenario relative to the uncoordinated scenario and the 
consumers  are  the  only  guaranteed  beneficiaries  of  coordination.  Wu  et  al.  (2007)  addressed  the 
problem  of  distribution  channel  design  under  demand  uncertainty  and  focused  on  how  demand 
uncertainty and production cost influence on the equilibrium distribution channel structure. Ha and 
Tong (2008) investigated contracting and information sharing in two competing supply chains. Xie et 
al. (2011) analyzed quality improvement in competing supply chains. Wu et al. (2012) addressed the 
decision of integration or decentralization from manufacturers’ perspective in competing supply chains 
under  demand  uncertainty.  They  found  the  impact  of  demand  uncertainty  on 
integration/decentralization was complicated since it could favor either integration or decentralization, 
depending  on  how  demand  uncertainty  was  characterized.  Manasakis  et  al.  (2014)  examined  the Q. Li and Z. Liu  / International Journal of Industrial Engineering Computations 5 (2014) 
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downstream firms' incentives to invest in cost-reducing R&D and to form a RJV, under two alternative 
structures of input supply: exclusive vertical relations and a single supplier. 
Since  the  effect  of  the  Cournot  competition  is  not  considered  in  competing  supply  chains  with 
manufacturers’  R&D  reducing  the  cost,  the  usual  conclusions  from  the  above  literature  may  be 
different from this study. This paper analyzes the channel decisions of two competing supply chains 
consisting  of  one  supplier  and  one  manufacturer.  The  two  supply  chains  compete  on  products’ 
quantities as well as non-price factor, R&D level, when the two manufacturers conduct technological 
innovation. This paper analyses the supply chain members’ production, R&D level and profit in three 
scenarios:  DD  (two  decentralized  supply  chains),  DC  (one  decentralized  supply  chain  and  one 
centralized supply chain) and CC (two centralized supply chains). 
This  paper  is organized  as follows:  the  problem  is described in  section  2. Section  3  analyzes the 
competition equilibrium in DD, DC and CC and the results are discussed and compared in section 4. 
Finally, conclusions and implications for further research are given in section 5. 
2. Model Description 
Consider two competing supply chains both consisting of one supplier and one manufacturer. Each 
supply chain produces the same product as the other supply chain. The supply chain members have 
symmetry information. The manufacturer uses one unit of the intermediate product to produce one unit 
of final product. Similar to D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Hinloopen (1997), Banerjee and Lin 
(2001) and Ishii (2004), we assume that the demand for the final product is linear:  j i i q q a p    (i，
j=1，2 and i≠j).  i q is the demand for product i,  i p  is the price of product i. Assume the margin 
production cost of both manufacturers is c. To maintain analytical tractability, we don’t consider the 
suppliers’ margin production cost. The manufacturers both take on process innovation to reduce their 
cost by  i x (R&D level), we assume the innovation cost is  2 /
2
i rx , which assures that the profit function 
is concave on  x (Gupta & Loulou, 1998). 
In  this  paper,  the  manufacturer  dominates  the  whole  supply  chain  in  each  supply  chain,  so  the 
manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader. Our model can be described as a four-stage game. At stage one, 
each manufacturer decides between a centralized and a decentralized channel simultaneously and non-
cooperatively. At stage two, depending on the choices of the two manufacturers, there are three channel 
structures:  DD,  DC,  CC,  where  DD  represents  that  the  two  supply  chains  are  decentralized,  DC 
represents that one supply chain is decentralized and the other is centralized, CC represents that the two 
supply chain are centralized. Next, the competing supply chains make their decisions according the 
following order: (1) the manufacturers or supply chains determine the R&D level at the same time; (2) 
the suppliers determines the wholesale price; (3)the manufacturers or supply chains take on Cournot 
quantity  competition,  and  the  customer  buys  the  product.  Next,  we  will  analyze  the  equilibrium 
decisions of the three supply chain structures.  
3. Equilibrium decisions 
In  this  section, we establish  and  explore the  subgame  solution for  each  of  the  three  supply chain 
structures from the stage one game: DD, DC and CC.  
3.1 DD case 
In the DD case, the two manufacturers simultaneously determine their R&D level first, and then the 
two suppliers simultaneously set their wholesale prices. Finally, the two manufacturers take on Cournot 
quantity  competition.  We  use  backward  induction  to  study  the  equilibrium  decisions  of  the  DD 
scenario. 
The manufacturer’s profit function is   
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Solving the first order condition of production quantity yields, 
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The suppliers’ profit function is as follows, 
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Solving the first-order conditions of 
i s   with respect to  i w yields, 
j i i x x c a w
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1
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Inserting Eq. (2) and Eq. (4) into Eq.(1) results the following, 
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Solving the first order condition of 
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(6)  
3.2 DC case 
In  the  DC  case,  one  supply  chain  is decentralized  and  the  other supply  chain  is  centralized. The 
decentralized manufacturer and the centralized supply chain simultaneously determine their R&D level 
first,  and  then  the  decentralized  supplier  sets  the  wholesale  price.  Finally,  the  decentralized 
manufacturer and the centralized supply chain take on Cournot quantity competition. We use backward 
induction to study the equilibrium decisions of the DC scenario. 
In the decentralized supply chain, the supplier’s profit functions and the manufacturer’s profit functions 
are as follows: 
1
2
1 1 2 1 1 1
1
( ) ,
2
m q a q q w c x rx          
(7) 
1 1 1. s wq     (8) 
The total profit function of the centralized supply chain is as follows, 
2
2
2 1 2 2 2
1
( ) .
2
sc q a q q c x rx         
(9)  
Solving the first order condition of production quantity yields, 
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(11) 
For the decentralized supplier, the optimal wholesale price is as follows, 
2 1 1 4
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4
1
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4
1
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(12)  
Inserting Eqs. (10)-(12) into Eq. (7) and Eq. (9) yields the following, 
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Therefore, we get the first order condition of the R&D level 
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Based on the equilibrium R&D level, we derive the equilibrium production quantity, manufacturers’ 
and suppliers’ profit and the total profit of whole supply chain. 
3.3 CC case 
When the two supply chains both follow the centralized strategy, based on the collective rationality, the 
members of both supply chains choose the strategy to maximize the whole supply chains’ profit. The 
two supply chains simultaneously determine their R&D  level  first, and then they take on Cournot 
quantity  competition.  The  competition  between  the  two  supply  chains  is  the  same  as  competition 
between duopoly. Then, the problem can be described as following functions 
2
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1
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Solving the first order condition of quantity, we have  
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Inserting  1 q  and  2 q  into Eq. (17) and Eq. (18), we obtain 
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Deriving the first order condition with respect to  1 x  and  2 x  yields the following, 
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Based on the equilibrium R&D level, we derive the equilibrium production quantity and the total profit 
of both supply chains. 
4. Analysis of equilibrium results 
The equilibrium results, including production quantity, R&D level, wholesale price, players’ profit and 
the supply chains’ total profit, are different in the three channel structures, shown in Table 1. Next we 
compare the results. 
4.1 Comparison of equilibrium results 
(1) Production quantity 
DC DD
i
CC
i
DC q q q q 1 2     
Proposition  1:  In  DC  scenario,  the  supply  chain  which  takes  centralized  supply  chain  structure 
generates  the  largest  production  quantity;  In  CC  scenario,  the  two  supply  chains  get  the  second 
production quantity; In DD scenario, the two supply chains get the third production quantity; In DC 
scenario, the supply chain which takes decentralized supply chain structure gets the least production 
quantity. 
Table 1  
Equilibrium solutions under three scenarios 
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Proposition 2: The R&D level of the supply chain choosing centralized supply chain structure in DC 
scenario is the largest, and the R&D level of CC scenario is the second largest, and the R&D level of 
DD scenario is the less, while the R&D level of the supply chain choosing decentralized supply chain 
structure in DC scenario is the least. 
(3) Total profit 
DC
s
DC
m
DD
s
DD
m
CC
i
DC
i i 1 1 2             
Proposition 3: The total profit of the supply chain choosing centralized supply chain structure in DC 
scenario is the largest, and the total profit of CC scenario is the second largest, and the total profit of 
DD scenario is the less, while the total profit of the supply chain choosing decentralized supply chain 
structure in DC scenario is the least. 
4.2 Nash equilibrium analysis 
 
We get the Nash equilibrium of supply chain competition as Table 2 shows. 
 
Table 2 
Nash equilibrium of supply chain competition 
  SC2 
SC1  Decentralized  Centralized 
Decentralized 
DD
1  ,
DD
2   
DC
1  ,
DC
2   
Centralized 
CD
1  ,
CD
2   
CC
1  ,
CC
2   
 
As Table 2 shows, for supply chain 1 and 2, taking centralized supply chain structure is their strictly 
dominant strategy. The equilibrium solution for this supply chain system is CC strategy. Previous study 
shows that the coordination of supply chain will lead to prisoner's dilemma under price competition. 
This study shows that, under quantity competition, the supply chain system’s equilibrium solution is 
CC strategy, which is good for both supply chains, and there is no prisoner's dilemma. 
The management implications of this study are that CC strategy will be helpful to increase the profits of 
supply chain companies. In the real business, enterprises should cooperate more closely with other 
enterprises in the supply chain, share information and make decisions together. They should determine 
the production quantity according to the market demand so as to obtain benefit from the coordination of 
supply chain. Furthermore, they should not blindly expand the scale of the enterprise, to avoid the 
phenomenon of excess production capacity. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper considers the Cournot competition of two competing supply chains, in which each consists 
of one supplier and one manufacturer. The two manufacturers both conduct technological innovation. 
This paper analyses the supply chain members’ production, technology strategy and profit in three 
scenarios:  DD  (two  decentralized  supply  chains),  DC  (one  decentralized  supply  chain  and  one 
centralized  supply  chain)  and  CC (two  centralized  supply  chains).  By  means  of  game  theory,  we 
analyze the competition equilibrium and coordination strategy. The results indicate that the production, 
the R&D level and the total profit of the supply chains in DC scenario are the largest, those of the CC 
scenario come second, those of the DD scenario come third and those of the decentralized supply chain 
in  DC  scenario  are  the  smallest.  The  two  supply  chains  could  obtain  a  balanced  solution  in  CC 
scenario, and the classical prisoner’s dilemma will not appear in the supply chain system, and that the 
CC supply chain structure strategy is good for both supply chains. 
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